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PRIOR RESTRAINT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
Ariel L. Bendor· and Michal Tamir•• 
In this Article we argue that the digital revolution requires a reshaping of the 
Doctrine ofPrior Restraint, which prohibits the implementation of any regulations that 
prevent the publication of speech prior to its distribution. We describe the prohibition 
on prior restraint of speech, its rationales and its exceptions; present the characteris-
tics of the media in the digital age; suggest that the traditional design of the Doctrine 
does not fit these characteristics; and describe the reshaping that we propose in order 
to adapt the Doctrine to the age of the Internet and social networking. 
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lNTRODUCTION 
This Article argues that the unique characteristics of the digital age justifY reshap-
ing the Doctrine of Prior Restraint-a cornerstone of First Amendment jurispru-
dence--and suggests adapting the Doctrine to the age of the Internet and social media. 
The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, adopted by the United States Supreme Court in 
Near v. Minnesota, 1 forbids the implementation of regulations which prevent the 
publication of speech prior to its distribution, including orders to remove an expres-
sion that has already been published. 2 According to the Doctrine, restrictions of 
speech ordinarily should only be enforced by imposing ex post criminal or civil sanc-
tions. 3 Although it is permissible to punish certain hannfu1 expressions, such as libels, 
after their dissemination, ''there are strict limitations on the constitutionality of pre-
venting such expressions before they occur. •>4 A major implication of the Doctrine--
on which this Article focuses-is the courts' refusal to issue injunctions against 
speech on the grounds that "an injunction against speech is the very prototype of the 
greatest threat to First Amendment values. "5 
First Amendment protections apply to new media. 6 This is significant because 
a large part of today' s opinion market is conducted online. 7 Even so, the emergence 
of the network society has raised substantive questions regarding the interpretation 
of the First Amendment in an era when an Internet connection and a computer ac-
tualize the ability to transmit messages to potentially large audiences. 8 
We argue that the digital revolution requires a reshaping of the Doctrine ofPrior 
Restraint As Justice Cardozo put it almost a hundred years ago: "We do not inquire ... 
'what the legislator willed a century ago, but what he would have willed if he had 
1 283 U.S. 697 (1931 ). At least some aspects of the Prior Restraint Doctrine have far more 
ancient roots thanNearv. Minnesota. See generally Michaell. Meyerson, The Neglected History 
of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: Rediscovering the Link Between the First Amendment and 
the Separation of Powers, 341ND. L. REv. 295,308-13,324--33 (2001); Stephen A. Siegel, 
Injunctions for Defamation, Juries, and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 655, 
674--78 (2008). 
1 See Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul 
of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 311, 340 (2011). 
3 Ariel L. Bendor, Prior Restraint, Incommensurability, and the Constitutionalism of 
Means, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 289, 291 (1999). 
4 Id. 
5 Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 797 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
6 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884--85 (1997). 
7 See W. Danny Green, Comment, The First Amendment and Cell Phones: Govern-
mental Control over Cell Phone Use on Publicly Owned Lands, 44 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1355, 1384 
(2012); Brandon Wiebe, Comment, BART's Unconstitutional Speech Restriction: Adapting 
Free Speech Principles to Absolute Wireless Censorship, 4 7 U.S.F. L. REV. 195, 218 (2012). 
8 See, e.g., MANuELCAS1EU.S, COMMUNICATION POWER 51 (2009); Jared Schroeder, Fo-
cusing on How Rather Than on Whom: Constructing a Process-Based Framework for Inter-
preting the Press Clause in the Network-Society Era, 19 COMM. L. &POL'Y 509, 510--12 (2014). 
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known what our present conditions would be. "'9 Free speech rights must be molded 
to address the challenges ofthe present digital age.10 
The Internet, and social media platfonns in particular, have some characteristics 
that distinguish them from traditional speech and media channels. Anyone who has 
access to the Internet can post expressions on a multitude of platfonns. Expressions 
that appear on the Internet, as long as they have not been removed, have eternal ex-
posure. Online news sources are open to everyone and access to them is not limited 
to professional journalists who are subject to ethical codes.11 The typical time gap 
between writing and publication on the Internet is extremely narrow. 12 Online pub-
lications, and the damage they cause, are forever. Internet access is extremely broad, 
and almost anyone, nearly anywhere, can view online publications. Posts on social 
media platforms or digital publications can have a global viral effect13 and can po-
tentially reach a huge audience through sharing. Accounting for all this, digital age 
technologies may enable courts to prevent unprotected expressions, without affecting 
the constitutionally protected parts of the same speech. These characteristics justify 
a reshaping of the Doctrine ofPrior Restraint. 14 
The escalation of the chilling effect created by the Doctrine of Prior Restraint in 
the age of the Internet and social networks generates numerous difficulties. Speech 
in the digital age is no longer limited to major, financially sound mass media, which 
benefit from legal advice and professional self-confidence. 15 Ex post criminal or civil 
sanctions, therefore, are likely to be particularly threatening to ordinary bloggers.16 
9 BENIAMINN. CARDOZO, THENA1lJREOFTHEJUDICIALPROCESS 84 (1921). 
10 See, e.g., Eric B. Einisman, Note, Switching the Flip: Questioning the Government's 
Authority to Shut Down Communication Networks in Furtherance ofPublic Safety, 31 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 181, 184 (2012). 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 102--07. 
12 See, e.g., Chris Hamilton, Breaking News Guidance for BBC Journalists, BBC (Feb. 8, 
2012,2:18PM),http://www.bbc.eo.uk/blogs/theeditors/2012/02/twitter_guidelines_for_bbc 
jou.html [https://perma.cc/YB9B-B86E]. 
13 Special difficulties arise due to the global nature of the new media, which is governed 
by legal regimes of different cowrtries that are not mutually compatible. This Article, which is 
oriented toward the constitutional law of the United States, does not address these difficulties, 
which relate both to substantive law and to its enforcement. For a discussion of the difficulties 
arising from the global nature of the Internet, see generally Allison R Hayward, Regulation 
ofBlog Campaign Advocacy on the Internet: Comparing U.S., German, and EU Approaches, 
16 CARDOZO J.INT'L & COMP. L. 379 (2008). 
14 Developments related to the digital age may also justify redesigning the protections on 
freedom of speech with respect to aspects that do not pertain to the Prior Restraint Doctrine. 
See generally Conor M. Reardon, Note, Cell Phones, Police Recording, and the Intersection 
of the First and Fourth Amendments, 63 DuKE L.J. 735 (2013) (asserting that reasonable 
seizures can become unreasonable when they threaten free expression, and seizures of cell 
phones used to record violent arrests are of that stripe). 
15 See generally Hayward, supra note 13 (discussing the global nature of the Internet). 
16 Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the Online 
Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMIL. REv. 137,202 (2008). 
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For parties without deep pockets, such as individuals and minor media entities, the 
risk of large-scale damages may lead to economic collapse. Such a risk could have 
a highly increased chilling effect on speech. 
This Article suggests a reshaping of the Doctrine of Prior Restraint designed to en-
hance the benefits provided by new media while diminishing the potential costs. 17 Our 
proposal consists of two components. First, courts will be empowered to issue orders 
to remove expressions from the Internet or from social networks, and, in exceptional 
cases, to issue injunctions against unpublished expressions. Though courts will have 
broad discretion on whether to issue a removal order or an injunction, they will not be 
obligated to issue the order even if the conditions necessary for its issuance are met. 
Second, to avoid the chilling effect and to give speakers the freedom to choose whether 
to take the risk of subsequent sanctions, claims for damages will be contingent, in 
accordance with the Mitigation of Damages (A voidable Consequences) Doctrine, 
upon the filing of an earlier application for an injunction or a removal order. 
Part I of this Article describes the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, presents its main ra-
tionales, reviews the exceptions to the prohibition on prior restraints of speech, and sug-
gests that prior restraints are frequently permitted when the threat to First Amendment 
values is not significant and the expected damage in the absence of prior restraint is 
significant. Part II addresses the general characteristics of the media in the digital age 
and suggests that the traditional model of the Doctrine of Prior Restraint does not fit 
these characteristics. Part ill describes the alterations that we propose in order to adapt 
the Doctrine of Prior Restraint to the age of the Internet and social networking.18 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROillBffiON ON PRIOR RESTRAINT AND ITS EXCEPTIONS 
Prior restraint of speech is defined as restricting speech before "its dissemination 
on the basis of content. "19 The Doctrine of Prior Restraint bars any prohibition on 
speech issued in advance of publication, 20 as well as any determination of the legality 
17 I d. For other suggestions with a purpose to reshape First Amendment doctrines in order 
to adjust them to the digital age, see Lili Levi, Social Media and the Press, 90 N.C. L. REv. 
1531 (2012). 
18 A multitude of scholars have criticized the Doctrine of Prior Restraint. See generally 
Bendor, supra note 3; John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 Y ALEL.J. 409 
(1983); William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of 
Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNElL 
L. REv. 245 (1982); Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in 
First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L.REv. 53 (1984); Marin Scordato, Distinction Without a Dif-
ference: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1989). However, 
this Article does not suggest the abolishment of the doctrine; rather, we propose how it can be 
adapted to the modem digital age. 
19 Nisha Chandran, Crossing the Line: When Cyberbullying Prevention Operates as a 
Prior Restraint on Student Speech, U.IIL. J. L. TEcH. &POL'Y 277, 291 (2016). See also ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POUCIES 978-79 (4th ed. 2011) 
(citing RODNEY A. SMOllA, SMOILAANDNIMMERONF'REEooMOFSPEECH § 8-4 (1994)). 
20 SeeNearv. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,721 (1931). 
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of particular expressions prior to publication.21 According to the Doctrine, the gov-
ernment and the courts are not permitted to restrain expressions before they are 
disseminated---either by administrative licensing regimes or by judicial injunctions22-
even if they may be constitutionally subjected to subsequent civil or criminal 
sanctions. 23 This also applies to types of expressions, such as obscenity, that are not 
fully protected by the First Amendment but are defined by ambiguous and indeter-
minable standards.24 The Doctrine of Prior Restraint applies to the government and 
courts only. 25 Private online platforms, such as Face book, Twitter andY ouTube, are 
not subject to the Doctrine and generally are allowed to censor publications or use 
other means of prior restraint. 26 
21 See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975). It has been 
argued that the development of the Doctrine ofPrior Restraint shows that the Doctrine con-
demns only content-based restrictions. Jacob G. Fleming. Note, The Case for a Modem Public 
Forum: How the Bay Area Rapid Transit System's Wireless Shutdown Strangled Free Speech 
Rights, 51 WASHBURNL.J. 631,641,641 nn74-75 (2012). 
22 See 2 RODNEY A. SMOI.IA, SMOLIAAND NIMMER ON FREEDoM OF SPEECH § 15-4 to -5 
(Supp. 2017); Larry Alexander, There Is No First Amendment Overbreadth (But There Are 
Vague First Amendment Doctrines); Prior RestraintsAren 't "Prior"; and "As Applied" Chal-
lenges Seek Judicial Statutory Amendments, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 439,443 (2011) ("There 
are two types of regulation that fall into [the prior restraint] category. One consists of those 
requirements that one obtain a license from some agency or person before engaging in the 
speech activity .... The other type of regulation deemed to be a prior restraint is the judicial 
injunction or order when directed against the content of speech or its time, place, or manner."); 
Douglas B. McKechnie, Facebookls Off-Limits? Criminalizing Bidirectional Communication 
Via the Internet Is Prior Restraint 2.0, 461ND. L. REv. 643, 664 (2013); Al-Amyn Sumac, 
Prior Restraints and Digital Surveillance: The Corutitutionality of Gag Orders Issued Under 
the Stored Communications Act, 20 Y ALEJ.L. & TEcH. 74, 77 (20 18); Jacqueline G. Waldman, 
Prior Restraint and the Police: The First Amendment Right to Disseminate Recordings ofPolice 
Behavior, U.IIL.L.REv. 311,319--20 (2014); seealsoJackM. Ba1kin. Old-SchooVNew-School 
Speech Regulation, 127 HAR.v. L. REv. 2296, 2299, 2306--29 (2014) ("[N]ew-school tech-
niques of speech regulation have effects similar to prior restraints, even though they may not 
involve traditional licensing schemes or judicial injunctions.''). 
23 See Redish, supra note 18, at 53. 
24 See Reardon, supra note 14, at 752 (asserting that "[t]he chief concern animating the 
prior restraint doctrine is that the hand of the government censor will operate to exclude 
disfavored speech before the speech reaches the public market. In the context of obscenity 
seizures, this danger is particularly acute. The indefinite nature of the obscenity standard, and 
of statutes that track that standard, lends itself to discretionary official action that suppresses 
protected speech as well as proscribed obscenity''). 
25 See Kate K.lonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing 
Online Speech, 131 HAR.v. L. REv. 1598, 1609 (2018). 
26 Seeid. at1599, l609;AndrewTutt,TheNewSpeech,4l HAsTINGSCONST.L.Q.235,238 
{20 14) (''There is no baseline constitutional right to protection from private censorship, ma-
nipulation, deception, or exclusion on the hrternet because major speech platforms are neither 
state actors nor 'places of public accommodation,' and therefore carry no obligation to guarantee, 
protect, or respect the expressive interests of the tens of millions of individuals who pass 
through their domains each day."). However, it has been argued that: 
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The Doctrine, therefore, creates a constitutional right to publish expressions that 
are not entitled to substantive constitutional protection. These expressions may be 
regulated only by ex post sanctions. 27 The significance of the Doctrine is that the 
category of substantively protected speech is narrower than the category of speech 
that cannot be curbed by prior restraint. 28 The Doctrine thus grants superiority to 
freedom of speech over other entitlements----5uch as the rights to good reputation 
and privacy-even in situations in which the expression violates these rights. 
The Supreme Court has yet to offer a compelling rationale for the Doctrine ofPrior 
Restraint 29 As we see it, however, the main rationale seems to stem from the desire to 
prevent the chilling of speech30 by censorship or similar means31 and to ensure that all 
expressions are included in the marketplace of ideas. 32 An efficient system of deterring 
harmful speech would be undesirable if it precluded valuable expressions from reaching 
the public, thereby limiting output in the marketplace of ideas. 33 If an expression is 
[I]mposing liability on infrastructure providers unless they surveil and 
block speech. or remove speech that others complain about, has many fea-
tures of a prior restraint, although technically it is notidentical to a classic 
prior restraint .... In this way, our twenty-first-century digital world has 
recreated the prior restraints of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
offering a twenty-first-centuryversion of administrative priorrestraint. 
Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REv. 2011, 2017-19 (2018). 
27 See Bendor, supra note 3, at 29 5. A similar "non-constitutional rule [is] that equity will 
not enjoin libel." ld. at291 n.2 (citingDOUGI.ASLAYCOCK, THEDEA1HOFTIIEIRREPARABLE 
INJURY RULE 164, 164 n.27 (1991)). 
28 See Jeffiies, supra note 18, at 426 (noting that the Doctrine ofPrior Restraint may bar 
injunctions against speech that the First Amendment does not protect). 
29 Steve Tensmeyer, Constitutionalizing Equity: Consequences of Broadly Interpreting 
the "Modem Rule" of Injunctions Against Defamation, 72 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 43, 
46 (2017). 
30 SeeNebraskaPressAss'nv. Stuart,427U.S. 539, 559(1976);ALExANDERM.BICKEL, 
THE MORAliTY OF CONSENT 61 ( 197 5) ("A criminal statute chills, prior restraint freezes."); 
SUSAN EASTON, THE PROBLEM OF PORNOGRAPHY: REGULATION AND 1HE RIGIIT TO FREE 
SPEECH 69 (1994) (observing that "[t]he American courts ... have favoured subsequent sanc-
tions over prior restraint because of the latter's chilling effect on publishers and film-makers''); 
Robert A. Sedler, Self-Censorship and the First Amendment, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. E1HICS & 
PuB. POL 'y 13, 15 (20 11) (asserting that ''the chilling effect concept is the most fundamental 
and pervasive concept in the 'law of the First Amendment.' ... The chilling effect concept 
is the basis of ... the New York Times rule," the rule against prior restraint of speech). 
31 For the close connection between censorship and prior restraint, see Derek E. Bambauer, 
Orwell's Armchair, 79 U. Cm. L. REV. 863,871-72 (2012). 
32 See Marla Brooke Tusk, No-Citation Rules as a Prior Restraint on Attorney Speech, 103 
COLUM. L. REv. 1202, 1223 (2003)(asserting that "[t]he most coDDllonly touted justification of 
the Court's predilection for subsequent punishment is that prior restraint does not permit certain 
expression to ever enter the marketplace of ideas, thereby imposing a more significant burden 
on speech"). 
33 See, e.g., DavidS. Ardia, Freedom ofSpeech, Defamation, and Injunctions, 55 WM. 
&MARYL.REv.1, 74 (2013). 
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banned under a system of prior restraint, it may never reach the market at all or may 
have to be withheld until it is approved. 34 As Larry Alexander has pointed out, "loss 
of time ... is a real cost if one's message is time-sensitive. It is the time the speaker 
must wait before speaking during which he tries to convince some court that his 
speech is constitutionally protected and thus should never have been enjoined. " 35 
Another major rationale of the Doctrine is the Collateral Bar Rule. 36 According to 
this Rule, judicial orders from courts give rise to an absolute duty of obedience, not-
withstanding any constitutional rights to engage in the enjoined conduct, unless and un-
til that order is set aside by the court that issued it or by a higher court on appeal. 37 In 
our opinion, however, it is difficult to view the Collateral Bar Rule alone as sufficient 
justification for the prohibition of judicial injunctions of unprotected expressions.38 
The Rule: 
does not prevent direct attacks on judicial orders on appeal or by 
petition. It merely prevents indirect attacks on such orders within 
the framework of contempt proceedings. In other words, a per-
son against whom a court has issued an injunction does not lack 
a remedy against that order. He [or she] may apply to a compe-
tent court and argue that the judicial order is unconstitutional ... 
without his [or her] application being dismissed in limine.39 
Although it is generally agreed upon that "prior restraint on expression comes ... 
with a 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity,'>4° the prohibition 
against prior restraint is not absolute.41 Courts have approved prior restraint where 
34 See, e.g., Chandran, supra note 19, at 304; Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior 
Restraint, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 657 (1955). 
35 Alexander, supra note 22, at 445. According to Jack M. Balkin, "[p ]rior restraints (which 
include licensing schemes) are especially troublesome because they shift the costs of action, 
the burdens of proof, and the consequences of inertia from the state to the speaker." Balkin, 
supra note 22, at 2316. 
36 See Alexander, supra note 22, at 444; Balkin, supra note 22, at 2317. 
37 See Walkerv. Binningham, 388U.S. 307,321 (1967);Alexander,supranote22, at444; 
Balkin, supra note 22, at 2317; Richard E. Labunski, The "Collateral Bar" Rule and the First 
Amendment: The Constitutionality ofEnforcing Unconstitutional Orders, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 
323, 327 (1988). 
38 See Bendor, supra note 3, at 352-55. 
39 ld. at 354. 
40 Organization for aBetter Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,419 (1971). See also Bantam 
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). 
41 See Ardia, supra note 33, at44--51; Christina E. Wells, Bringing Structure to the Law 
of Injunctions Against Expression, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 14 (2000) ("The Court's lan-
guage ... suggests an equation of injunctions and prior restraints, but the Court's practice ... 
included several cases in which it upheld injunctions against expression."). 
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the speech is deemed obscene, 42 where a prior restraint is needed to fulfill the right 
to a fair trial,43 where the expression is part of an unprotected commercial speech, 44 
where the speech was part of a continuing course of conduct, 45 and where the ex-
pression could endanger national security in time of emergency. 46 Courts have also 
approved prior restraint in order to protect privacy,47 in order to prevent employment 
discrimination, 41 in order to protect property, 49 in order to regulate public forums, 50 
and in order to prevent misleading commercial expressions. 51 
Courts have drawn a distinction between different forms of expression. 52 For 
example, injunctions that neutrally regulate only time, place, or manner of speech 
are permissible. 53 Historically, permanent injunctions were not permitted in defama-
tion actions, and damages were seen as a sufficient remedy for plaintiffs in such 
cases. 54 In unusual cases, however, courts have issued narrow permanent injunctions 
against specific statements that were found to be defamatory.55 Ibis issue was 
42 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) ("[T]he primary requirements of 
decency may be enforced against obscene publications."). 
43 See Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 538,569--70 (1976) (''However difficult 
it may be, we need not rule out the possibility of showing the kind of threat to fair trial rights 
that would possess the requisite degree of certainty to justifY restraint."). 
44 See San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d 1230, 
1239 (9th Cir. 1997). 
45 See Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1208--09 (6th Cir. 1990). 
46 See New York Times, Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Alexander 
Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 V AND. L. REv. 651, 692 (2017). 
47 See Porco v. Lifetime Entm't Servs., 116 A.D.3d 1264, 1266 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014). 
48 See Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 980 P.2d 846, 875 (Cal. 1999). 
49 See Barlowv. Sipes, 744 N.E.2d 1, 3--9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001 ); Advanced Training Sys. 
v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 1984); Guion v. Terra Mktg. ofNev., 523 
P.2d 847,848 (Nev. 1974);Mazzoconev. Willing, 369 A.2d 829, 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976), 
rev'd, 393 A.2d 1155 (Pa. 1978). 
50 See Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 325 (2002). 
51 SeeCentralHudsonGas&E1ec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,447U.S. 557,571 n.13 
(1980) ("We have observed that commercial speech is such a sturdy brand of expression that 
traditional prior restraint doctrine may not apply to it."); Amalgamated Acme Affiliates v. 
Minton, 33 S.W.3d 387, 395 (Tex. App. 2000). 
52 For instance, books and newspapers enjoy far greater protection from prior restraint 
than films, to which the prohibition is applied more narrowly. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE 
SYSTEMOFF'REEooMOFEXPRESSION 511-12 (1970). 
53 See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 763--64 (1994). For a critique of 
the Supreme Court's logic in Madsen, see OwenM. Fiss, The Unruly Character of Politics, 
29 MCGEORGE L. REv. 1, 3--10 (1997). 
54 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Injunctioru in Defamation Cases, 57 SYRACUSEL. REv. 157, 
167-70 (2007). 
55 See McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 2015); Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 
898 F .2d 1200, 1203--09 (6th Cir. 1990). For a discussion of the McCarthy v. Fuller decision, 
see Ann C. Motto, "Equity Will Not Enjoin a Libel": Well, Actually, Yes, It Will, 11 SEVEN1H 
CIR. REv. 271 (2016). 
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presented to the Supreme Court but was not decided upon the death of the plaintiff, 
a week after the oral arguments. 56 The Court resolved the case on narrow grounds 
without deciding the question presented as to whether injunctions are permissible 
in defamation cases. 51 
On this background, it was asserted that: 
[A ]lthough the overall number of decisions granting injunctions 
[in state courts] is small relative to the total number of cases in 
which plaintiffs requested injunctive relief, it is clear that a trend is 
emerging within both state and federal courts that permits injunc-
tions if the speech in question was adjudged to be defamatory. 58 
Nevertheless, some interpreters noted that ''the case law does indeed allow perma-
nent injunctions of unprotected speech, entered after a final judicial finding that the 
speech is unprotected, but does . . . n[ o ]t allow restraints entered before such a 
fmding. "59 
On the contrary, case law also provides a basis for the claim that the Doctrine 
of Prior Restraint forbids not only temporary preventive relief, but also permanent 
injunctions against speech. 60 This argument can be supported by the Supreme 
Court's ruling in Alexander v. United States.61 In that decision, the Court stated that 
56 Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734 (2005). 
51 I d. at 737-3 8. For a discussion of Tory v. Cochran, see Charles H. Whitebread, Going 
Out with a Whimper: A Term o[Tinlcering and Fine Tuning, The Supreme Court's 2004-2005 
Term, 27 WHITTIER.L. REv. 77, 159--60 (2005). 
58 Ardia, supra note 33, at 51. 
59 Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom ofSpeech and Injunctions in Intellectual 
Property Cases, 48 DuKE L.J. 14 7, 175 ( 1998). The authors point out that allegedly libelous 
speech is often not subject to preliminary injunctions because no final adjudication regarding 
its libelous nature can be reached at the preliminary injunction stage.Id. at 171-72; Richard 
Favata, Note, Filling the VoidinFirstAmendmentJurisprudence: Is There a Solution for&-
placing the Impotent System of Prior Restraints?, 72 FORDHAML. REv. 169, 187 (2003) 
(arguing that ''because prior restraints are generally issued prior to a full and fair hearing, it is 
difficult to determine whether the speech in question is in actuality unprotected. Therefore, 
prior restraints remain presumptively unconstitutional, even where the speech may be unpro-
tected"). See also Michael J. Pollele, Racial and Ethnic Group Defamation: A Speech-Friendly 
Proposal, 23 B.C.llnRD WORIDL.J. 213,245 (2003) (asserting that "some sparse authority 
suggests an injunction might lie against further repetitions of a defamation once the plaintiff 
has secured a jury verdict"). 
~0 See, e.g., Corinne Stuart, Comment, The Applicability of the Prior !restraint Doctrine to 
False Advertising Law, 21 GEO. MAsON L. REv. 531, 546--47 (2014); see also Michael I. 
Meyerson, Rewriting Nearv. Minnesota: Creating a Complete Definition o[Prior !restraint, 52 
MERCERL. REv. 1 087, 1137 (200 1) (pointing out that ''injunctive relief generally is unavailable 
for libel plaintiffs, even those seeking to silence statements previously adjudged to be libelous''). 
~I 509 U.S. 544 (1993). 
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''permanent injunctions--i.e., court orders that actually forbid speech activities-are 
classic examples of prior restraints" because they place a ''restraint on future speech. " 62 
The prohibition on prior restraint of speech is therefore neither rigid nor based 
on a dogmatic approach. Prior restraints are frequently permitted when the threat to 
First Amendment values is not significant and the expected damage in the absence 
of prior restraint is significant. 
II. THE COMPATIBILITY OF TilE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR 
RESTRAINT WITH THE DIGITAL AGE 
Andrew Shapiro outlines six characteristics of the digital age: many-to-many 
interactivity, flexibility, packet-based distribution networks, interoperability, large 
bandwidth or carrying capacity, and universality.63 These digital tools reveal a new 
existence--t"ather than a mere modification or perfection--of the old one. 64 
New sources of media have emerged in the digital age. Although lines between 
forms of media are blurring, 65 it can be said that, while "old media" refers to print 
newspapers, radios, and television broadcasts, 66 the term ''new media'' conveys a sense 
of the ability to broadcast in digital media and to do so instantly and to a global au-
dience "online."67 The term ''new media" encompasses an expanding and diversifYing 
set of applied communication technologies. 68 The new media bring together techno-
logical artifacts or devices, activities, practices or uses, and social arrangements or 
organizations that form around the devices and practices. 69 Its main features seem to 
be its interconnectedness, accessibility to individual users as senders or receivers, inter-
activity, multiplicity ofuse, open-ended character, ubiquity, and delocatedness.70 
The Doctrine of Prior Restraint was established and shaped in a communication 
world dominated by the old media.71 However, media revolution has occurred over 
the last several decades and the world of communication in which the Doctrine of 
62 Id. at 550. 
~3 ANDREWL. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOWTIIEINTERNETIS PuTTING IN-
DIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING 1HE WORLD WE KNOW 15--17 (1999). 
64 See Shulamit Almog, Creating Representations of Justice in the Third Millennium: 
Legal Poetics in Digital Times, 32 RUTGERS CoMPUTER& TEcH. L.J. 183, 189 (2006). 
~' David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REv. 429, 43 8 (2002). The term 
''media" itself is difficultto define. See Daniel Joyce, Media Witnesses: Human Rights in an 
Age of Digital Media, 81NTERCULTURALHUM. RTS. L. REv. 231, 233 (2013). 
66 See PETER STEVEN, T'HENO-NONSENSEGUIDETOGLOBALMEDIA27-30, 67 (2003); 
Emily Anne Vance, Should Prosecutors Blog, Post, Or Tweet?: The Need For New Restraints 
In Light Of Social Media, 84 FORDHAM L. REv. 367, 370 n.16 (2015). 
67 See STEVEN, supra note 66, at 72-73. 
68 DENISMCQUAIL,MCQUAIL'SMAsSCoMMUNICATIONT'HEORYPart2.6(6thed.2010). 
69 STEVEN, supra note 66, at 72-75. 
70 ld. 
71 See Favata, supra note 59, at 173-74 (describing how the Doctrine of Prior Restraint 
developed in early American law as a reaction to English practices). 
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Prior Restraint was developed has been dramatically altered. 72 The need to remodel the 
Doctrine does not necessarily indicate a change in values. It grew out of the media revo-
lution, which weakened certain assumptions underlying the Doctrine in its traditional 
formulation and involved some substantial developments that need to be addressed. 73 
In this Part, we describe and shed light on some prominent characteristics of the 
media in the digital age and discuss aspects in which unique characteristics of the 
new media may justify reshaping the Doctrine of Prior Restraint. 
A. Increased Chilling Effect on Ordinary Speakers 
Anyone with network access can post expressions on the Internet and social 
media platforms. Certainly, "[n]o longer [does] one need the permission of a narrow 
set of editors who control[] television channels or newspaper pages. "74 Any individ-
ual with a computer can launch a post to a website. 75 According to Justice Stevens, 
the Internet "provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of 
all kinds .... Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the 
same individual can become a pamphleteer."76 As a result, the Internet has evolved 
into "the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country-and in-
deed the world-has yet seen. "77 
A significant number oflntemet speakers, such as most Face book contributors 
and Tweeters, are not even quasi-joumalists.78 In most instances, such speakers do 
72 See Steven J. Venezia, The Interaction of Social Media and the Law and How to Survive 
the Social Media Revolution, 52 N.H. B.J. 24, 24 (2012) (noting major media developments 
since 1971 ); see also Balkin, supra note 22, at 2296. 
73 Cf. Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to 
the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YAIEL.J.1639, 1670-76 (1995).PartiV, entitled: 
"Threats to an Online Agora: Rethinking Some Principles of First Amendment Practice," 
describes First Amendment developments arising out of media changes. !d. 
74 Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Free Speech, 100 IOWAL. REv. 501, 506 (20 15). But 
see Lev~ supra note 17, at 1562 (describing the "decline of the traditional editorial role" of 
the old media due to the rise ofthe new media). 
75 See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2004) (pointing out that 
"[l]arge numbers of people can broadcast and publish their views cheaply and widely .... 
[T]he development ofweblogs (or blogs) allows people to publish content to the Internet 
with the press of a button, lowering the costs of publication and distribution even further"); 
Larry E. Rib stein, From Bricks to Pajamas: The Law and Economics of Amateur Journalism, 
48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 185, 187 (2006). 
76 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
77 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
78 For discussions of the status ofbloggers as journalists, see, e.g., Howard Fineman, Who 
is a "Journalist"?, 4 FIRsT AMEND. L. REv. 1 (2005); Anne Flanagan, Blogging: A Journal 
Need Not a Journalist Make, 16 FORDHAM INTEI.L. PROP. MEDIA & ENr. L.J. 395 (2006); 
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not consciously target their expressions to a mass audience. 79 In practice, however, 
their posts-which in most cases are not of any journalistic nature--may reach a 
huge audience and even become viral. 80 
A difficulty lies in the escalation of the chilling effect created, in this new age, 
by the Doctrine of Prior Restraint in its traditional design. The Doctrine forbids the 
freezing of expressions by banning the issuance of anti-speech injunctions. 81 How-
ever, it deters many lawful expressions as a result of the fear of exposure to subse-
quent sanctions. 82 The Doctrine therefore has a chilling effect, "which occurs when 
a governmental action has the indirect effect of deterring a speaker from exercising 
her [or his] First Amendment rights."83 While a "chilling effect" on speech can be 
defined in general terms as a "collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom of expres-
sion, by making the individual ... more reluctant to exercise it,"84 chilling effects 
are undesirable as long as they also deter people from protected expressions. 85 In-
deed, chilling expression may be a far more serious issue than prior restraint. 86 
Thus, for instance, "[b ]ecause the standards for awarding presumed damages in 
defamation cases are somewhat elusive, appellate courts have difficulty in evaluating 
claims that damages awards are excessive. The consequence is that the courts are gen-
erally liberal in evaluating the awards. "87 "Consequential damages from defamation 
are usually speculative and always uncertain in amount."88 Before the rise of the new 
media, the accessibility of public speech was limited to financially sound mass 
media, which had readily available legal advice and professional self-confidence. 89 The 
birth of the new media, in contrast, dramatically increased the accessibility of speech 
to a wider range of people.9° For the general public, individual bloggers, and the 
Anastasia Heeger, Securing a Journalist's Testimonial Privilege in the International Criminal 
Court, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 209 (2005). 
19 DANIEL!. SOLOVE, 1HEFuruRE OF REPUTATION: GoSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRivACY ON 
THE INTERNET 61 (2007). 
10 Id. at62. 
81 Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993). 
82 See, e.g., Bendor, supra note 3, at 329-31; Mayton, supra note 18, at 253-54; Frederick 
Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effoct," 58 B.U. L. 
REv. 685, 728 (1978). 
83 See Monica Youn, The Chilling Effect and the Problem of Private Action, 66 V AND. 
L. REv. 1473, 1474 (2013). 
84 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). 
15 Id. 
86 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1041 n.16 (2d ed. 1988). 
87 See Michael K. Steenson, Presumed Damages in Defamation Law, 40 WM. MITCHElL 
L. REv. 1492, 1516 (2014). 
81 Douglas Laycock, The Death of the I"eparable Injury Rule, 103 HAR.v. L. REv. 687, 
744 (1990). 
89 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, New Media in Old Battles? Barron's Contextual First 
Amendment and Copyright in the Digital Age, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 952, 964 (2008). 
90 Balkin, supra note 22, at 2304. 
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unorganized media characteristic of this new media, ex post criminal or civil sanc-
tions are particularly more threatening.91 For those without deep pockets, the risk of 
large-scale damages may lead to economic collapse. 92 Such a risk may impact their risk 
management, potentially heightening instances of the chilling effect on speech. 
In terms of a IIlllik:etplace of ideas, a significant chilling effect may be considerably 
worse than the freezing effect of injunctions. An injunction is focused on a specific 
expression and is only issued after a court fmds that the expression, at least prima 
facie, is not constitutionally protected.93 In contrast, the vagueness of the distinction 
between protected and unprotected expressions, as well as ordinary people's fear of 
subsequent criminal or civil sanctions, may prevent them from publishing even pro-
tected speech or may motivate them to remove such speech after receiving a warning 
that they will be sued if they do not delete it. 94 This may reduce, rather than expand, 
the scope of opinions in the digital age. 
In order to prevent chilling of protected expressions, the Supreme Court has 
developed the Overbreadth Doctrine,95 according to which speakers can challenge 
a statute on the basis that it would be impermissible as applied to others, but not to 
themselves. 96 The principal purpose of the Overbreadth Doctrine is to protect third 
parties--who might fear prosecution under an overbroad statute-from self-censoring 
constitutionally protected speech. 97 Chilling effects have also been invoked by the 
courts in "a wide variety of contexts to justifY customized adjustments of particular 
legal rules in light of their purported uncertainties. •>9S As Leslie Kendrick puts it: 
[T]he term "chilling effect" refers to a concern that an otherwise 
legitimate rule will curb protected expression outside its ambit. 
This phenomenon generally arises when would-be speakers, 
faced with the uncertainties of the legal process, refrain from 
91 Cioll~ supra note 16, at 202. 
92 ld. 
93 Chemerinsky, supra note 54, at 171. 
94 Cf Alexander, supra note 22, at 439-41 (arguing that vague First Amendment tests 
chill free speech, not overbreadth). 
95 See, e.g., RA.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,402 (1992) (White, J., concurring) ("The 
overbreadth doctrine has the redeeming virtue of attempting to avoid the chilling of protected 
expression.''); Massachusettsv. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 584 (1989)("0verbreadthis a judicially 
created doctrine designed to prevent the chilling of protected expression."). 
96 For the Overbreadth Doctrine, see, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767--69 
(1982); Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 
235,261-79 (1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense ofOverbreadth, 100 YALEL.J. 
853 (1991); Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth Facial Challenges and the Valid 
Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 359 (1998); Harvard Law Review Forum, Overbreadth 
and Listeners' Rights, 123 HAR.v. L. REv. 1 (2010). 
97 See Oakes, 491 U.S. at 581. 
98 See Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REv. 
1633, 1655 (2013). 
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making protected statements. This is an evil of constitutional 
proportions because free speech is an affmnative value, which 
the government has a particular obligation to promote, or at least 
not to deter.99 
It seems that, as in other contexts, the courts have shaped First Amendment doc-
trines in order to minimize the chilling of protected expressions. 100 This should also 
be done with respect to the Doctrine of Prior Restraint in the digital age. 
B. The Lesser Impact of Journalistic Ethics on Ordinary Bloggers 
The fact that many printed and broadcast media have Internet editions101 does 
not limit the openness of the Internet to additional forms of media. Bloggers and 
other new media speakers direct their texts to a wide public. However, ordinary 
bloggers often lack the professionalism associated with traditional forms ofmedia.102 
The writings of such bloggers are not published on institutionalized sites, hence are 
not subject to professional editing or journalistic standards.103 In this respect, most 
99 ld. 
10° For example, one might note the concern of the Second Circuit about the chilling of pro-
tected expression that might result if schools are given the authority to punish speech that 
occurs off-campus. See Thomas v. Bd. ofEduc., 607 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979) ("The 
risk is simply too great that school officials will punish protected speech and thereby inhibit 
future expression.''). 
101 See Barb Palser, We've Only Just Begun, 24 AM. JOURNALISM REv. 39 (2002); Levi, 
supra note 17, at 1533. 
102 See Sunny Woan, The Blogosphere: Past, Present, and Future. Preserving the Unfet-
tered Development of Alternative Journalism, 44 CAL. W. L. REv. 477, 484 (2008). 
103 See, e.g., Steven Keslowitz, The Transformative Nature ofBlogs and Effect on Legal 
Scholarship, 2009 CARDOZO L. REv. DE Novo 252, 268 (noting the fact "that blawgs [legal 
blogs] ... lack a viable mechanism for filtering content by means of a sustained, methodical 
selection and editing process"); Lee F. Peoples, The Citation ofBlogs in Judicial Opinions, 
13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTEIL PROP. 39, 51 (2010) (noting that "comments in blogs lack the 
editing ... oflaw journals"); see also Adam Cohen, The Media That Need Citizens: The First 
Amendment and the Fifth Estate, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 78 (2011) (noting that "[n]etworked ap-
proaches to editing news may not be much worse than the old media model"); Lili Levi, A 
New Model for Media Criticism: Lessons from the Schiavo Coverage, 61 U. MIAMIL. REv. 665, 
691 (2007) (observing that"[ o ]ne does not need to be a professional journalist to be a blogger; 
many well-known bloggers are not and do not operate under traditional journalistic standards 
and ethics''); Robert M O'Neil, The Drudge Case: A Look at Issues in Cyberspace Defamation, 
73 W ASH.L.REv. 623,624 (1998) ("[a]nonlinejownalistpublishes informally, lacking editors, 
lavvyers and many of the other indicia of traditional print or broadcast medium ... .'');Benjamin 
J. Wischnowski, Note, Bloggers with Shields: Reconciling the Blogosphere 's Intrinsic Editorial 
Process with Traditional Concepts of Media Accountability, 91 IOWAL. REv. 327, 329, 344 
(2011) (arguing that due to "the concomitant lack of uniform editorial standards" in blogs, 
"[t]he separate test for bloggers would direct courts, as an initial matter, to assess peer review 
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speakers in the new media differ from journalists in the established printed and 
broadcast media Journalists working under the umbrella of traditional media "typically 
operate subject to a set of ethical and professional norms, made explicit in a host of 
ethical codes and, more importantly, absorbed by individual journalists in a deeply 
embedded sense of professional identity that shapes and constrains their actions. "104 
Indeed, the average blogger is a diarist who does not follow any code of ethics.105 
A similar rationale led the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to refrain from applying 
the rules it adopted in 2009106 for "consumer-generated media" to journalists who 
work for newspapers, magazines, or television and radio stations, which-in contrast 
to the new media-have independent editorial responsibility and, as a result, are 
more trustworthy than those without it.107 
The internal norms of the old media "are a far better predictor of the nature and 
limits of press behavior than any norms that could be imposed from the top down 
by the courts."108 Accordingly, there has been a call for "new media outlets that do 
want to be taken seriously as news providers ... to establish their credibility as a 
journalistic source," by adopting ethical policies similar to those of the established 
old media 109 Even though, hypothetically speaking, ''journalism ethics codes may 
provide a useful model"110 for "bloggers and others with the capacity to invade pri-
vacy," the ability to motivate speakers in the new media to adopt and apply ethical 
norms seems extremely limited.u1 Even if such a proposal has any feasibility for 
and blogger-to-blogger collaboration--both of which are a form of editorial oversight, albeit 
horizontal"). As for traditional books, see Michael J. Kelly & David Satola, The Right to Be 
Forgotten, 2017 U.IIL. L. REv. 1, 13 (''Traditional publication processes also contain screening 
devices through layers of editing and peer review that help ensure accuracy. Alternatively, 
electronic news sources, websites, blogs, and other Internet sources can instantaneously spring 
up without the underlying support of screening from editors and publishing houses."). 
104 Paul Horwitz, "Or of the [Blog] ", 11 NEXUS J. OP. 45, 59 (2006). See also Blake D. 
Morant, The Endemic Reality of Media Ethics and Self-Restraint, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
Ennes & PuB. POL'Y 595 (2005). 
105 See SOLOVE, supra note 79, at 24, 59. 
106 Guides Concerning the Use ofEndorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F .R 
§ 255 (2009). 
107 See Cohen, supra note 1 03, at 2-3. This stands in conflict with Ellen Goodman's assertion, 
in an article published in 2006, that "[ o ]nee bloggers become the conduits for paid promo-
tions, the extent to which they truly function outside the commercial media is questionable. For 
now, ... it may well be fitting to exempt [bloggers] from sponsorship and other disclosure 
requirements ... at least until their role in public discourse and the Internet regulatory appa-
ratus becomes clearer." Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 
TEx. L. REv. 83, 151 (2006). 
108 Horwitz, supra note 104, at 59. 
109 Cohen, supra note 103, at 76. 
110 Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation 
of the Press, 91 CALIF. L. REv. 1039, 1103 (2009). 
m A question that this Article does not address concerns the enforcement of content re-
strictions on Internet speakers, including by means of prior restraint, by intermediaries such 
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those new media of an institutionalized nature, it is certainly not applicable to any 
"individual who Tweets from the scene of a natural disaster or who occasionally 
posts amateur videos ofprotests."112 
The target audience for legal regulation concerning new media is fundamentally 
different from that with respect to the traditional media. The Doctrine of Prior Re-
straint in its current formulation was developed in a society characterized by in-
stitutionalized media hierarchically structured with a dominant role for editors and 
guided by journalistic ethics. The Doctrine, which limits the involvement of the 
judiciary in enforcing rights, such as the right to good reputation and to privacy, to 
ex post criminal and civil sanctions, was not intended for a reality in which infringe-
ment of such protected entitlements is not exceptional. In a media environment 
where self-subordination to ethical norms is not common, it is necessary to reshape 
the constitutional rules. 
C. Ease and Immediacy of Publication 
The convenient and immediate use of a widely accessible social platform allows 
participants to easily create a global harm. 113 A tort or an offense committed by 
online means is accomplished by typing a hasty post and pressing "send."114 Unlike 
a book or a newspaper article, which demands time to write and is usually accompa-
nied by research and revisions, posts on social media are written casually and spon-
taneously.115 Furthermore, writing a book or an investigative journal article is usually 
as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. For discussions on this issue, see, e.g., Raphael Cohen-
A1magor, The Role of Internet Intermediaries in Tackling Terrorism Online, 86 FORDHAM 
L. REv. 425 (2017). Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 1996, Internet 
service providers are not responsible for heels published through the use of their services, even 
iftheytakeonsome editorialrolewithrespecttothe content. 47 U.S. C.§ 230(cX1) (2012). De-
spite the section, private expression-platforms restrict the freedom of expression of their users 
by means of prior restraint. SeeN ote, The Impermeable Life: Unsolicited Communications in the 
Marketplaceofideas, 118HARv.L.REv.1314, 1315--16,1332-33 (2005)(notingthatlnternet 
service providers can use filtering technologies to screen individuals from information). 
112 Cohen, supra note 103, at 76. 
113 See, e.g., Frank D. Lomonte, Fouling the First Amendment: Why Colleges Can't, and 
Shouldn't, Control Student Athletes' Speech on Social Media, 9 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 1, 2 (2014) 
(explaining, that with respect to campus regulators, "[w]hat makes social media novel and 
empowering--that it is an immediate, unfiltered way to 'speak' with thousands of people at 
once-is also what makes it frightening .... "); Graham H. Ryan, Comment, What Went 
Wrong on the World Wide Web: The Crossroads of Emerging Internet Technologies and 
AttorneyAdvertisinginLouisiana, 71 LA.L.REV. 749,755 (2011)(mentioning''immediate 
publication" as a benefit of advertising on the Internet). 
114 See, e.g., Jennifer Westhoff, Consideration of Legal Ethics in Using Social Media, 38 
Los .ANGELES LAw. 9, 9 (2015) ("Social media are by nature casual and hasty forms of 
communication."). 
ns See, e.g., Nancy S. Kim, Web Site Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009 UTAH 
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accompanied by editing and legal advice. 116 In contrast, writers of quick social media 
posts rarely receive such editing or advice. 117 New media platforms shorten the distance 
from a thought to its actuation in writing. With the unbearable ease of tapping the key-
board, almost any computer-literate person can commit a criminal offense or a 
tortious breach. 118 For example, it has been recognized that even "[b ]ombmaking in-
formation is literally at the fingertips of anyone with access to a home computer 
equipped with a modem."119 
The ease and immediacy of speech in the digital age leads to hasty and impulsive 
publications, particularly on social media platforms, as well as in talk-backs. 120 The 
value of such expressions to the marketplace of ideas and information is often 
limited.121 With regard to unprotected expressions--on the makers of which the 
L. REv. 993, 1017 ("[A]nonymity and the ease and pace of the Internet may encourage 
impulsive behavior.''). 
116 See, e.g., EllynM. Angelotti, TwibelLaw: WhatDefamationandltsRemediesLookLike 
intheAgeofTwitter, 13 J.HIGHTEcH.L. 433,451 (2013)("Intheworldofpassivepublica-
tion, the editorial process provides time, edits and checks for a writer during the storytelling 
process. Many media companies allocate substantial resources to ensure high journalistic 
quality and accuracy. Copy editors are specifically devoted to catching and correcting errors; 
upper-level editors guide the content and help the writer make tough ethical calls prior to 
publication-especially regarding sensitive content Many media companies even have lawyers 
on hand to consult about questionable stories and situations throughout the process and also 
review stories before publication.''). See also Susan P. Shapiro, Libel Lawyers as Risk Counsel-
ors: Pre-publication and Pre-broadcast Review and the Social Construction of News, 11 L. 
& POL 'y 281, 288--89 (1989) (an overview of the process of pre-publication or pre-broadcast 
review in an article published before the age of social media). 
117 See, e.g., HeidiFrostestsd Kuehl, Free Speech and Defamation in an Era ofSocialMedia: 
An Analysis of Federal and Rlinois Norms in the Context of Anonymous Online Defamers, 36 
N. IlL. U. L. REv. 28, 34 (2016) ("Under the current structure of dissemination of information 
in the virtual world, individuals could presumably anonymously create or post false online 
statements on a social media site or through an Internet Service Provider ("ISP") without any 
editing or direct recourse by the ISP or social media site .... "). 
118 Vincent Angermeier, Comment, Swingingfor the Fences: How Comprehensive Drug Test-
ing, Inc. Missed the Ball on Digital Sources, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1587, 1616 (201 0). 
119 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPoRT ON THE AVAILABllJTY OF BOMBMAKING INFORMA-
TION, THE EXTENT TO WinCH ITS DISSEMINATION IS CONTROlLED BY FEDERAL LAW, AND 
1HE ExTENT TO WinCH SUCH DISSEMINATIONMA Y BE SUBJECT TO REGULATION CoNSISTENT 
WTIH 1HE FIRsT AMENDMENT TO TIIE UNITED STATES CONS1TIUTION at i, 7 (1997), http:// 
cryptome.org/abi.htm [https://perma.cc/28BU-PBE2]. See also Laura K. Donohue, Terrorist 
Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 233, 281 (2005). 
120 See, e.g., Nancy S. Kim, Website Design and Liability, 52 JURIME1RICS 3 83, 384 (2012) 
(pointing out that a regrettable online behavior which has emerged within the last decade is 
''the impulsive posting of images or information (about oneself or others) without consideration 
of context or long-term implications''); Rodney K. Smith & Patrick A Shea, Religion and the 
Press: Keeping First Amendment Values in Balance, 2002 UTAHL.REv.l77, 207 (asserting 
that"[ w ]ith the rise of the internet and other new technologies, these pressures will be inten-
sified, resulting in an increasing desire to get the news out 'Faster! Faster!"'). 
121 Cody Delistraty, Has the Internet Broken the Marketplace of Ideas? Rethinking Free 
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Constitution allows the imposition of sanctions--the weight of considerations that 
underlie the prohibition on prior restraint of speech is reduced. 
D. Eternity, Broad Access, and Virality 
The Doctrine ofPrior Restraint was originally created and designed in an environ-
ment with a relatively short-term memory.122 The damage caused by a printed or broad-
casted speech was significant until another headline replaced it and the speech was 
naturally forgotten.123 In contrast, as long as expressions appearing on the Internet are 
not removed, they have eternal exposure.124 As the character ofErica Albright put it in 
the film The Social Network:. "The [I]nternet's not written in pencil ... it's written in 
ink .... " 125 "[T]he Internet rarely forgets."126 An online infringement is ongoing.127 
Posts that were displayed online decades ago can seriously harm a person today. 
Additionally, Internet access is extremely wide.128 Almost anyone, nearly any-
where, can be exposed to the Internet and can view blogs and social media posts. As 
a result, damages caused by new media releases may be greatly enhanced. While books 
and newspapers are usually accessible only to those who buy them or are exposed 
to them by chance, the Internet is accessible to nearly every child in the modem 
world.129 The extent of the damage may therefore be huge, in light of both the number 
Speech in the Digital Age, DocuMENTJ. (Nov. 5, 2018), http://www.documentjoumal.com 
/2018/11/has-the-intemet-broken-the-marketplace-of-ideas-rethinking-free-speech-in-the-digi 
tal-age [https://permacc/QQV6-5FAU]. 
122 Compare that to today' s landscape, where some see the establishment of a ''right to be 
forgotten" as the only way to extinguish negative stories. Jeffery Too bin, The Solace of Ob-
livion, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29 
/solace-oblivion [https://perma.cc/VBN3-SCSQ]. 
123 See id. 
124 See Jennifer Spencer, No Service: Free Speech, the Communications Act, and BART's 
Cell Phone Network Shutdown, 27 BERKElEY TECH. L.J. 767, 789-90 (2012) (pointing out 
that"[ s ]peech may remain on the Internet for a long period of time, and illegal activity stem-
ming from it may not occur right after the posting of the content''). 
m 1liE SOCIAL NETWORK (Sony Pictures 201 0). 
126 Andrew L. Roth, Upping the Ante: RethinldngAnti-SLAPP Laws in the Age ofthelntemet, 
2016 B.Y.U. L. REv. 741, 754. 
127 See Ernest Drucker, Drug Law, Mass Incarceration, and Public Health, 91 OR. L. REv. 
1097, 1114-15 (2013) (explaining, regarding child pornography, that "[a]s these films and 
photos are widely distributed on the Internet, where they remain in permanent circulation, 
they come to constitute a long-term assault on these children's lives as they grow into adults. 
By constantly re-stimulating the victim's trauma into adulthood, this market continues a source 
of ongoing damages done by the initial production''). 
128 Internet World Stats, Usage and Population Statistics, INTERNET WORID STATS, 
https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm [https://perma.cc/ZT2G-LEQV] (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2019) (stating that, as of June 30, 2018, there were 4,208,571,287 Internet users 
around the world). 
129 UNICEF, CHILDREN IN A DIGITAL WORID 1 (2017) (''Children and adolescents under 
18 account for an estimated one in three internet users around the world.''). 
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of people exposed to the publications and the inability to conceal them from people 
immediately affected by them. In the past, parents who wanted to keep their children 
from being exposed to offensive information could hide the newspaper or prevent 
them from watching television. Today, every child who has a smartphone can access 
that information on the Internet or through a social media platform. 
The sophisticated and efficient search engines, characterizing the digital age, 
make access to new media much easier too.130 Indeed: 
[I]fthere are some controversial items in a book about a subject 
or person, it probably is not highlighted in the way that a Google 
search would retrieve the items. Unless it appears in electronic 
form or on Google Books, a book would need to be inspected to 
physically find the controversial information, but a search en-
gine can take web users instantaneously to the precise location 
ofthe information in question.131 
General publications on the Internet and social media posts in particular might 
become globally viral. 132 The term ''virality" is a description of ''the quick perme-
ation of thoughts, information, and trends into and through a human population."133 
"[O]nce a rumor takes hold in cyberspace, it may be almost impossible to root out."134 
The information in the new media comes out and is received at a tremendous speed; 
indeed, as Andrew Roth puts it, ''viral content shared via social networks spreads much 
like an epidemic, spilling over from one network to another in rapid succession."135 
Monetary compensation is not necessarily an effective remedy for ongoing and 
even viral harm. 136 Criminal punishment is also incapable of dealing with an offense, 
the consequences of which continue to develop after its perpetration in a manner that 
13° Kelly & Satola, supra note 103, at 13. 
131 Id. 
132 See, e.g., Amy Kristin Sanders, Fast Forward Fifty Years: Protecting Uninhibited, 
Robust, and W'uie-Open Debate after New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 48 GA. L. REv. 843, 
844-45 (2014). 
133 Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Petitions and Institutional Legitimacy, 37 CARDOZOL. 
REv. 891' 926 (20 16). 
134 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 
49 DuKEL.J. 855,885 (2000). 
135 Roth, supra note 126, at 754. 
136 See Mary Margaret Giannini, Slaw Acid Drips and Evidentiary Nightmares: Smoothing 
Out the Rough Justice of Child Pornography Restitution with a Presumed Damages Theory, 
49 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1723, 1741-42 (2012); Elad Pe1ed, Rethinking the Continuing Violation 
Doctrine: The Application ofStatutes a/Limitations to Continuing Tort Claims, 41 OmoN.U. 
L. REv. 343, 383-86 (2015) (arguing that, "[w]here a prospectively continuing violation of 
the plaintiff's rights is recognized," the preferred remedy should be "systematic employment 
of injunctive relief. Within that reliefthe court would order the defendant to put an end to 
the injurious state of affairs by ceasing his conduct"). 
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is not necessarily predictable.137 Truly, "[t]he prior restraint rules limit plaintiffs to 
less effective remedies because we fear overenforcement of rules against offensive 
speech. . . . Courts do not forbid prior restraints because other remedies are ade-
quate, but because they are affirmatively hostile to prior restraints!'138 The tremen-
dous and eternal global exposure and potential virality of the new media increase the 
harmfulness inherent in unprotected expressions on the Internet. 139 They also sig-
nificantly reduce the inherently limited effectiveness of imposing damages and criminal 
punishment for publication of digital expressions.140 Given the concern with respect 
to the chilling effect of these subsequent sanctions, 141 the justification for exempting 
speech in the new media from the policy that usually avoids any prior restraint 
remedies--even for unprotected expressions-is magnified. 
137 Giannini, supra note 136, at 1742 (describing child pornography victims' difficulty in 
articulating ongoing harms related to knowledge of images being possessed). 
131 Laycock, supra note 88, at 744--45. Laycock asserts that: 
!d. 
On the usual criteria of irreparable injury, both damages and criminal 
prosecution are grossly inadequate. Money damages cannot replace a 
reputation once lost, or erase emotional distress once suffered. Neither 
can be accurately valued in dollars. Consequential damages from defa-
mation are usually speculative and always uncertain in amount. Both 
because the thing lost is irreplaceable and because the loss is hard to 
measure, damages are an obviously inadequate remedy for defamation. 
The same analysis could be applied to any other category of unprotected 
speech .... Criminal punishment neither undoes the hann nor com-
pensates for it. It may provide revenge or deterrence, but it is not a 
remedy. Thus, the subsequent remedies for speech torts and speech 
crimes are grossly inadequate, in the sense in which adequacy is usually 
measured under the irreparable injury rule. 
139 See, e.g., Winhkong Hua, Note, Cybermobs, Civil Conspiracy, and Tort Liability, 44 
FORDHAMURB. L.J. 1217, 1218 (2017) ("The Internet allows individuals to be hurt in ways 
that simply did not previously exist. Several examples demonstrate the new types of harms 
that have become available when people use the Internet as a tool of harassment: from false 
accusations, gender discrimination, and inexplicable ire, to the scorning of people who tread 
past certain social norms.''); Roth, supra note 126, at 7 54-55 (20 16) ("[T]he Internet also has 
the potential to drastically amplify the harms caused by libelous statements. This is because 
the Internet increases the ability of ordinary users to cause significantly more reputational 
damage than would be possible with traditional media. . . . Two other peculiar aspects of 
Internet discourse make defamatory statements published online particularly volatile: virality 
and permanence. First, the potential for libel to 'go viral' augments the harm to defamation 
victims by exponentially expanding the reach of libelous statements .... Indeed, viral content 
shared via social networks spreads much like an epidemic, spilling over from one network 
to another in rapid succession .... Next, the Internet rarely forgets."). 
140 See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 
WASIL L. REv. 335,336 (2005) ("Cyberspace offers unscrupulous people an entirely new 
venue in which to conduct harmful activities without a significant chance ofbeing identified, 
let alone punished."). 
141 See supra Section II.A. 
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E. Technical Ability to Separate Protected from Unprotected Speech 
Digital technologies enable the courts to separate unprotected expressions from 
the constitutionally protected parts of speech and to remove only the former of such 
expressions. 142 Deleting or altering parts of expressions in the old media, such as 
parts of an article in a printed newspaper or book, is very difficult to implement in 
practice. In contrast, the new digital technologies are built to alter or remove specific 
fragments of speech or even a few words.143 Courts can easily order the deletion or 
alteration of parts of a post or a blog.144 Just as the technological revolution that gave 
rise to the digital age changed the media in a way that would justify a previously 
problematic prior restraint, so too, can the new technologies moderate the means of 
prior restraint and reduce them to the least necessary level. 
The proposed separation between protected and unprotected speech is an analogy 
drawn from the constitutional Severability Doctrine.145 This Doctrine: 
allows a court to excise any unconstitutional clauses or applica-
tions from a statute, leaving the remainder in force if the legisla-
ture would prefer that result to the statute's total invalidation. 
This makes possible as-applied adjudication and allows a court 
to save as much of a statute as it possibly can. 146 
Just as a court may abolish only the unconstitutional parts of a law by exercising the 
Severability Doctrine, new technologies allow the court to order the deletion of only 
the constitutionally unprotected parts of text from the network. 
142 See, e.g., TheDigitalMillenniumCopyrightAct, 17U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E)(i)(limiting 
the liability of an internet service provider that voluntarily, or by court order, removes or 
disables access to content that violates the Act). 
143 See, e.g., Timothy J. Brennan, Do Easy Cases Malee Bad Law? Antitrust Innovations 
or Missed Opportunities in United States v. Microsoft, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1042, 1058 
(2001) (pointing out that"[ a ]lthough Microsoft would not delete the IE source code (i.e., the 
computer program) from its copies ofWindows 95, it agreed to delete that part of the source 
code that would display the IE icon on the Windows 95 screen, or desktop, so consumers 
would not automatically presume that IE was on the computer''). 
144 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2)(E)(i). 
14
' David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 16 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 639, 639 
(2008). 
146 I d. See also, e.g., Hannah Garden-Monheit, Comment, Using Severability Doctrine to 
Solve the Retroactivity Unit-of-Analysis Puzzle: A Dodd-Frank Case Study, 80 U. Cm. L. REV. 
1885, 1887 (2013) (asserting that ''in the severability context judicial modesty recommends an 
assumption that statutory provisions are independent of one another"); Kenneth A. Klukowski, 
Severability Doctrine: How Much of a Statute Should Federal Courts Invalidate?, 16 TEx. 
REv. L. & POL. 1, 3 (20 11) (pointing out that "[ e ]ach time a court strikes down a statutory pro-
vision, it must determine whether to invalidate only the unconstitutional provision, or instead 
whether to invalidate the statute in its entirety or in substantial part. Severability is the doctrine 
of determining whether part or all of a statute can survive without the invalid provision''). 
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ill. ADAPTING TIIE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR RESTRAINT TO TIIE DIGITAL AGE 
In accordance with the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, governmental and judicial 
authorities are required to make significant efforts to use less speech-restrictive means 
to address public and private concerns before taking more extreme measures such 
as a network-wide shutdown.147 
The development of the new media requires adapting and updating legal doctrines 
developed in the past.148 Thus, "censorship is seen as anathema to deeply held beliefs 
about the importance of unfettered discourse and free expression. "149 Even so, "[s ]hould 
the government censor the Net, ... it should do so directly-using legislation that is 
tailored to the problem, that incorporates safeguards informed by the history of prior re-
straint, and that creates a system that is open, transparent, narrow, and accountable."150 
In this Part, we propose a twofold reshaping of the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 
tailored to the distinctive characteristics of the digital age and the new media. The 
proposed reshape does not address the aspect of the Doctrine that focuses on the 
prohibition on administrative licensing of speech, since the development of the new 
media does not justifY such a reshape. Our proposal addresses the aspect of the 
Doctrine that relates to judicial orders and injunctions. We believe there is room for 
adapting the Doctrine to the characteristics of the digital age. 
Indeed, not all the characteristics of the new media, as described and discussed 
in Part ll, apply to any expression in this media However, the two proposals de-
scribed below apply to any expression that appears or is intended to appear on the 
Internet or in the social media, since every expression in the new media has at least 
some of these characteristics. Only in rare cases are expressions in the current era 
not published or expected to be published on the Internet or social networks. 
Therefore, in practice, our suggestions apply to all sorts of expression. 
A. Granting Judicial Injunctions and Removal Orders Concerning Speech in the 
New Media 
Due to the immediacy of expression in the new media and other characteristics 
of the digital age,151 injunctive requests to prevent new media expressions which 
have not yet been published will likely be rare. For instance, the guideline for 
journalists set forth in the Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics, to 
"[ d]iligently seek subjects of news coverage to allow them to respond to criticism 
147 See Einisman, supra note 10, at 206. 
148 See, e.g., Scott P. Kramer, The Intersection between Social Media Speech and Domestic 
Violence: Tweeting Harassment, 28 CBARECORD 34 (Apr./May 2014). 
149 Bambauer, supra note 31, at 872-73. 
150 /d. at 930. 
151 See supra Part II. 
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or allegations ofwrongdoing,"152 does not reflect the practice among bloggers who 
are not professional journalists. Requesting a response from subjects of coverage can 
allow them time to apply for an injunction against publication. 
Concerns with respect to the issuance of permanent and temporary judicial 
orders regarding publications that have already been distributed have increased in 
significance in the digital age. 153 It may be claimed that an injunction of that kind 
is not necessarily unconstitutional under the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, since the 
restraint of speech is not "prior"; rather, it takes place after the publication has been 
distributed or displayed for a time. 154 However, this argument alone is not persua-
sive. Removing an expression published on a medium with an eternal nature reduces 
its public visibility, starting from the time ofremoval.m Such removal will not be 
hermetic due to the characteristics of the Internet, and some accessibility to the 
expression will remain. 156 In spite of these concerns, this remains a prior restraint. 
As referenced previously,157 even if case law provides certain indications that an 
injunction with respect to publication may be legitimate if granted in the framework 
of a fmal judgment, and not as a temporary remedy, these indications are not con-
clusive and the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue. 
However, the special characteristics of the new media justifY, as in other areas 
where the constitutional legitimacy of prior restraints of speech has already been 
recognized, 158 a flexible judicial manner. This is certainly the case with respect to 
152 Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics, SPJ (Sept 6, 2014,4:49 PM), https:// 
www.spj .org/ethicscode.asp [https:/ /perma.cc/CC5F -ffi6F]. 
153 See supra Part II. 
154 See Peled, supra note 136, at 385 n.423. 
m See, e.g., Ardia, supra note 3 3, at 82 ("An injunction likely would have its greatest utility 
in situations where there is a danger of recurrent violation by the defendant and the speech has 
not been widely disseminated. Surprisingly, a number of defendants have actually conceded 
that they would continue to defame the plaintiff absent a court order enjoining their behavior. 
In such situations, an injunction prohibiting the defendant from continuing to publish his 
defamatory speech might be an effective remedy .... An injunction may also be a useful and 
appropriate remedy if the defamatory material is only circulating within a limited community 
and the injlDl.Ction prohibits dissenllnation of the speech outside that community .... [A]n in-
junction may be an effective remedy where the defendant has created banners, distributed 
flyers, posted billboards, or has otherwise communicated the defamatory speech only to a 
limited audience."). 
156 See Stacey B. Steinberg, Sharenting: Children's Privacy in the Age of Social Media, 
66 EMORYL.J. 839, 872 (2017) (arguing that ''remedies could potentially require parents to 
delete offensive material from Internet sites they own, but this would do little to control the 
information shared on sites not owned or controlled by the parent. Additionally, these 
remedies would be ineffective in many cases where the material has been downloaded or 
shared by third parties and would offer little protection to a child who is already emotionally 
harmed by viral online disclosure. Furthermore, once information is shared, despite its future 
deletion, companies might retain the previously available data"). 
157 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
151 See supra notes 42-58 and accompanying text. 
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permanent injunctions for the removal of expressions. It is also the case in appropri-
ate exceptional cases that pertain to temporary removal orders. A combination of 
factors--including the increased chilling effect of subsequent sanctions on ordinary 
speakers/59 the lesser impact of journalistic ethics on bloggers/60 the ease and im-
mediacy of new media publications, 161 the eternity of such publications, 162 broad 
access to the new media, 163 virality of speech, 164 and the technical ability to separate 
protected from unprotected speech in the digital age165-makes prior restraint in the 
digital age essentially different from the restraint anticipated by the drafters of the 
traditional Doctrine of Prior Restraint. 
Prior restraint of speech, including speech on the Internet, is not a trivial matter. 
It requires deep thought and careful judicial discretion. Despite the traditional 
equitable principle that the granting of preliminary relief is largely subject to the 
discretion of the court, a court that grants preliminary relief against expression 
should expect no deference in the course of appellate review. 166 
B. Retraction and Injunction Requests as a Condition for Damages 
In order to reduce the chilling effect and give speakers the freedom to choose 
whether to take the risk of subsequent sanctions, we propose that the awarding of 
damages for harm caused by unprotected speech in the new media be made contin-
gent upon submitting a request for retraction to the offending party, and if he or she 
refuses, filing an application for an injunction or a removal order. If such a request 
is made, and the offending party removes the publication, damages will be imposed 
only for injuries caused until removal. 
The sub-constitutional Mitigation offiamages (Avoidable Consequences) Doctrine 
precludes an injured party from recovering damages for losses that he or she could 
reasonably have avoided.167 If a plaintiff can reasonably take measures to eliminate 
damages, rather than merely minimizing them, the Doctrine requires him or her to 
do so.168 Similar to the Mitigation of Damages Doctrine, 169 in many states, the request 
159 See supra Section II.A. 
160 See supra Section II.B. 
161 See supra Section II. C. 
1~ See supra Section II.D. 
163 See supra Section II.D. 
164 See supra Section II.D. 
165 See supra Section II.E. 
166 See Redish, supra note 18, at 88-89. 
167 Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory 
ofContractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 967 n.2 (1983). See also YehudaAdar, Com-
parative Negligence and Mitigation of Damages: Two Sister Doctrines in Search ofReunion, 
31 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 783, 792 {2013). 
168 Douglas H. Cook, Personal Responsibility and the Law of Torts, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 
1245, 1253 (1996). 
169 See Donna M. Murasky, Avoidable Consequences in Defamation: The Common-Law 
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for retraction serves, according to legislation or case law, as a criterion for determin-
ing whether a libel suit was filed in good faith.170 Like the general Mitigation of 
Damages Doctrine, the burden of requesting retraction, which is incumbent upon the 
plaintiff in a defamation action, is "to 'use such means as are reasonable under the 
circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages. "'171 This sub-constitutional state 
law applies to defamatory publications in the new media as well. 172 
We suggest that constitutional status be granted to the Mitigation of Damages 
Doctrine with respect to speech in the new media. Seeking damages for violation of 
an anti-speech entitlement, such as the rights to good reputation, privacy, and in-
tellectual property (to the extent that the intellectual property that was harmed conflicts 
with freedom of expression), will be contingent upon a retraction request, and if the 
request is not accepted by the defendant, by a plea for injunction or a removal order. 
A plaintiff has a primary right for a defendant not to act unlawfully; this right 
should ideally be protected by injunction and only as a second-best remedy to 
damages.173 The traditional Doctrine of Prior Restraint bars prohibition on speech 
issued in advance of publication, principally because of the fear of freezing the expres-
sion or of postponing it if the specific expression is time-sensitive. 174 This rationale 
itself supports making damages contingent upon the plaintiff's prior demand to remove 
the speech from the Internet. The need to prevent chilling of expression and to 
preclude deterring ordinary people from expressing themselves in the new media, 
while respecting their freedom of choice, makes it necessary for persons who believe 
that their rights have been violated by an unprotected speech in the new media to 
first demand the removal of that speech. Only if this demand is rejected will the 
injured party be entitled to claim damages for the harm caused by the speech. 
Duty to Request Retraction, 40 RUTGERSL.REv.167, 175-76 (1987) (assertingthat"[i]nthe 
case of defamation, the rationale for the rule applies with particular force. A retraction, if granted, 
not only may remedy and prevent economic loss but also, and perhaps more important, is likely 
to be the best method of curing a loss that is not easily measured in monetary terms-that 
of vindicating the reputation of a person who has been falsely accused of some misdeed''). 
170 See, e.g., John C. Martin, The Role of Retraction in Defamation Suits, 1993 U. Cm. 
LEGAL F. 293,294 (pointing out that "[t]raditionally, retraction has served as evidence of an 
absence of malice as revealed in both case law and state statutes. Similarly, a refusal to re-
tract has sometimes been used to buttress allegations that a defendant published a defamatory 
article maliciously"). 
171 See Allison E. Horton, Beyond Control? The Rise and Fall of Defamation Regulation 
on the Internet, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1265, 1293 (2009) (quoting C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF 
DAMAGES 127 (1935)). 
172 See Je:fiKosse~ Private or Public? Eliminating the Gertz Defamation Test, 2011 U. 
Ill.. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 249, 267--68. 
173 Kenneth W. Simons, The Puzzling Doctrine ofContributory Negligence, 16 CARDOZO 
L. REv. 1693, 1705--06 (1995). 
174 See Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,561 (1976) ("As a practical matter, 
moreover, the element oftime is not unimportant if press coverage is to fulfill its traditional 
function of bringing news to the public promptly."). 
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The court that hears the motion for injunction or removal order will have to 
exercise careful discretion while attributing considerable weight to First Amendment 
values. The need to effectively protect the First Amendment values also dictates the 
awarding of damages for harm caused by expression in the new media only after 
careful judicial consideration. The court should be convinced that, under the circum-
stances of the case, it was not appropriate to order the removal of the expression and 
thereby prevent the chilling effect of the damages. 
CONCLUSION 
The Doctrine of Prior Restraint in the United States is rooted in nineteenth-
centwy cases from state courts, which recognized and implemented protections against 
prior restraints as integral components of state constitutional provisions. 175 The 
Doctrine as it stands today was formulated almost nine decades ago, in the 1931 Near 
v. Minnesota Supreme Court decision.176 Over the years, a technological revolution 
has taken place; this revolution gave rise to the digital age, one of the main manifes-
tations of which is the new media. 
While the major rationales of the Doctrine of Prior Restraint have not changed 
in the digital age, the characteristics of the new media require a reshaping of the 
Doctrine. The required reshape does not result from a change in the rationales of the 
Doctrine, but rather, from the need to promote them in the digital age. 
The new media increase the risk to freedom of expression and the marketplace 
of ideas as a result of subsequent sanctions on unprotected expressions. 177 At the 
same time, the new media also increase the harm caused by unprotected expression 
to rights including the right to good reputation and the right to privacy. 178 These 
implications stem from the combination of the increased chilling effect of subse-
quent sanctions on ordinary speakers in the new media, the lesser impact of journal-
istic ethics on ordinary bloggers, the ease and immediacy of publication, the eternal 
nature of new media speech, the broad access to it, and the technical ability to 
separate protected from unprotected speech. 179 
The flexibility and indeterminability of the Doctrine of Prior Restraint has 
enabled its adaptation in the past to changing social needs.180 These attributes of the 
Doctrine also allow it to be reshaped in order to suit the digital age. In light of the 
combination of the new media characteristics, we propose a two-component reshap-
ing of the Doctrine of Prior Restraint: first, empowering courts to issue orders to 
remove new media expressions and, in exceptional cases, to issue injunctions against 
175 Meyerson, supra note 1, at 1087. 
176 Nearv. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
177 See supra Section II.A. 
178 See supra Section II.B. 
179 See supra Part II. 
180 See supra Part I. 
2019] PRIOR RESTRAINT IN 1HE DIGITAL AGE 1181 
unpublished expressions; and second, granting speakers freedom to choose whether 
to take the risk of subsequent sanctions by constitutionalizing the Mitigation of 
Damages Doctrine with respect to speech in the new media. 
"Law must be stable and yet it cannot stand stil1."181 This famous insight182 by 
Roscoe Pound, Dean of Harvard Law School from 1916 to 1936,183 is particularly apt 
in the field of constitutional law. Indeed, ''to keep our constitutions vital, we must en-
sure that the law is stable but never stands sti11."184 In order to maintain the stability 
of the values underlying the Constitution in the digital age, some change of its 
interpretation is needed. This is the aim of the proposed reshape of the Prior Re-
straint Doctrine. 
181 ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923). 
182 See, e.g., The Honorable Roger J. Miner,A Significant Symposium, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REv. 15, 16 (2009--2010). 
183 See Deans of Harvard Law School, HARv. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu/aboutlhis 
tory/hls-deans [https://perma.cc/UH8V-8B9J] (last visited Apr. 11, 2019). 
184 The Honorable Margaret H. Marshall, "Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn from 
their Children": Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age ofGlobal Jurisprudence, 19 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. 1633, 1655 (2004). See also Robert B. McKay, Stability and Change in Constitutional 
Law, 17 V AND. L. REv. 203, 203 (1963) (''The law regards change merely fortbe sake of change 
with suspicion, demanding in tbe name of stare decisis special justification for departure from 
tbe past. But tbe law also has its moments of movement, particularly in tbe ever-shifting domain 
of constitutional law."). 
